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Abstract
Aotearoa New Zealand has no unified regulatory 
system governing the ethical and legal issues that 
arise with surrogate pregnancy arrangements. 
Accordingly, legal scholars and moral philosophers 
have recently called for revision to parentage and 
payment around surrogacy. Several academics have 
additionally suggested making surrogate pregnancy 
arrangements enforceable under New Zealand 
law. This discussion combines empirical research 
with key informants and experts working in the 
field of assisted reproduction with interview data 
from surrogate mothers and ovarian egg donors 
about their experiences of donating reproductive 
materials and services. The aim of the article is to 
expand the conceptual toolkit of assisted human 
reproduction to better understand the donative 
acts of women who share their reproductive 
materials and services, and to critically examine 
calls to introduce a regulatory model that makes 
surrogacy enforceable in light of concerns about 
the relational complexities of these arrangements. 
Keywords surrogacy, relational gifting, adoption, 
reproductive legislation
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Non-commercial surrogate pregnancy is at one and the same time prohibited in numerous 
jurisdictions around the world (Allan, 
2017) and regarded as a legitimate 
pathway to family formation for people 
experiencing medical or social infertility 
(Berend, 2016; Imrie and Jadva, 2014; 
Teman, 2009). As a pathway, surrogacy may 
be the last option for heterosexual couples 
when other forms of fertility treatment 
have failed or a first step to creating a 
family for gay couples and single men. 
Surrogate pregnancy encompasses two 
types of arrangement. In traditional 
surrogate pregnancy, a woman carries a 
foetus, as well as providing genetic material, 
for intended parents. These arrangements 
can occur without fertility clinic intervention 
and ethical review. In cases of gestational 
surrogacy, the birth mother provides the 
gestational services, but the gametes are 
provided by others (usually, but not always, 
the intended parents) through in-vitro 
fertilisation techniques. In Aotearoa New 
Zealand, gestational or clinic-assisted 
surrogacy is a regulated procedure under 
the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2004 (HART Act) and must 
be approved via a process of ethical review 
by the Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ECART). 
The body of legal and bioethical research 
on surrogacy in New Zealand is substantial 
and growing (Alawi, 2015; Anderson, 
Snelling and Tomlins-Jahnke, 2012; Ceballos, 
2019; Powell, 2017; Walker and Van Zyl, 
2017; Wilson, 2018, 2019; Van Zyl and 
Walker, 2015), but with very few social 
science studies of the lived experience of 
surrogate pregnancy. This article presents 
empirical data from two qualitative studies 
discussing the motivations of surrogate 
mothers and ovarian egg donors. The aim 
of the article is to expand the conceptual 
toolkit of assisted human reproduction 
(AHR) to better understand the donative 
acts of women who share their reproductive 
materials and services. A corollary aim of 
the discussion is to examine the call to 
enforce surrogate pregnancy arrangements 
under New Zealand law. 
New Zealand legislation
New Zealand legal scholars and ethicists 
have recently called for amendment to 
the HART Act and supporting legislation, 
in relation to the enforceability of 
surrogate pregnancy arrangements. A key 
concern for these commentators is that 
the HART Act provisions say very little 
about surrogate pregnancy arrangements 
and leave several issues unresolved. This 
criticism is not new. In 1999, Anne Else 
referred to the legislation around AHR 
at the time as ‘confused’ and ‘piecemeal’, 
saying, ‘a comprehensive new approach 
is urgently needed’ (Coney and Else, 1999, 
p.56). More recently, Powell and Masselot 
have commented that ‘New Zealand law, 
as it currently stands, fails to adequately 
address the complex issues around 
commercial surrogacy, and surrogacy 
generally’ (Powell and Masselot, 2019, 
p.vii). The point these commentators 
make is that the legislation, which is a 
blend of the HART Act, Adoption Act 1955 
and Status of Children Act 1969, creates 
unnecessary stress for those involved, is 
not purpose-built, and requires overhaul. 
A key recommendation for change 
pertains to section 14(1) of the HART Act, 
which states: ‘A surrogacy arrangement is 
not of itself illegal, but is not enforceable 
by or against any person.’ Commentators 
who advocate reform want to enforce 
surrogacy arrangements to protect 
surrogates should the intended parents 
decide, for whatever reason, that they do 
not want the baby. Conversely, 
enforceability of the arrangement would 
protect the intended parents if the 
surrogate decided they did not want to 
relinquish the baby upon birth. 
A second recommendation concerns 
legal parentage and calls to amend the 
Status of Children Act so that intended 
parents are automatically parents upon the 
baby’s birth. Under current law, the woman 
who becomes pregnant is the legal mother 
of the baby to whom she gives birth. Her 
partner, if she has one and they have 
consented to the donative procedure, is the 
other legal parent of the child. The intended 
parents, who may or may not have genetic 
links to the baby via gametes, have no legal 
relationship to the child until it is 
transferred to them through New Zealand 
adoption legislation. 
Under section 10 of the Adoption Act, 
which is used to transfer parentage from 
the surrogate (and her partner) to the 
intended parents, the latter must apply for 
and obtain an adoption order from the 
Family Court. The surrogate must sign a 
consent statement in the form of an 
affidavit to relinquish the baby, and a social 
worker is required to provide a report for 
the court regarding the suitability of the 
intended parents in respect of the 
application (Casey, 2014). 
AHR vocabulary
These issues have attracted a range of 
recommendations for reform from 
legal scholars, such as pre- or post-birth 
parenting orders, the creation of a new 
Surrogacy Act, and amendment to the 
Status of Children Act. My concern with 
enforcing surrogacy arrangements is 
that it is out of step with the local and 
institutional moralities that underpin the 
promotion of donative acts and practices 
in New Zealand. A central problem is the 
term altruism, which is used in recruitment 
and promotional literature around AHR. 
Altruistic procurement of reproductive 
materials and services is legally mandated 
under the HART Act. Although the term 
altruism is not used in the act, it has been 
used in the Advisory Committee on 
Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ACART) guidelines and Oranga Tamariki 
website information (Oranga Tamariki, 
2019). The word altruism is also used by 
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the fertility clinic Repromed on their 
website. Fertility Associates, which has 18 
clinics across New Zealand, does not use 
the term on its website, but does refer to 
egg donors giving ‘the ultimate gift’. The 
link to ‘Becoming a donor’ says: ‘Being a 
donor is about giving the most amazing 
gift to a family in need. A chance to have 
a baby’ (Fertility Associates, 2019). 
Unsurprisingly, the same phrase is not 
used in the link to ‘Sperm donors needed 
– more info’. This may be due to the 
gendered labour required of sperm donors, 
which does not conjure an image of 
selflessness or sacrifice in the same way as 
egg donation. 
I have argued elsewhere that the 
conflation of altruism with gift is 
misleading when used in relation to 
contemporary moral economies that 
promote the donation of bodily cells, tissue 
and organs, since the term gift is deployed 
by stakeholders, donors and recipients 
alike in a variety of different ways (Shaw, 
2015). Rather than relying solely on 
altruism, I suggest expanding the 
conceptual toolkit of AHR to help explain 
why surrogate pregnancy arrangements 
should not be enforceable. 
To do so, I draw on two studies. The 
first study was designed to investigate the 
motives of women who donate reproductive 
materials and services, the kinds of 
relationship (if any) that resulted from 
their actions, and the relationship between 
the moral experience of donors and the 
vocabulary available to describe and 
articulate their experiences (see Shaw, 
2008). This research involved fieldwork and 
in-depth interviews with 14 women about 
their experiences of egg donation and 
surrogate pregnancy. Of the 14 women in 
the study who donated ovarian eggs, three 
had also been involved in traditional 
surrogate pregnancy arrangements, and 
one had been a gestational surrogate. 
The second study draws on qualitative 
research undertaken from 2017 to 2020 
with key informants and experts about 
their views on AHR.1 This project includes 
in-depth interviews with 45 New Zealand 
and Australian legal scholars, lawyers, 
ethicists, social scientists, fertility clinic 
specialists, counsellors, ethics committee 
members and representatives of stakeholder 
groups. The participants in this study were 
recruited by convenience sampling and 
snowballing. The data was analysed 
thematically (Braun and Clarke, 2013) and 
documented participants’ views on policy 
and legislation around AHR, compensation 
and payment for surrogate mothers and 
gamete donors, information disclosure 
around donor conception, donor–recipient 
relationships, and access to fertility 
treatment.
Framing donative motivations 
To frame the experiences and social-
psychological motivations of surrogate 
mothers and egg donors, I draw on four 
concepts that I have used in previous 
research (Shaw, 2015) to talk about bodily 
donation: unconditional gift; relational 
gifting; gift exchange; and body project. 
The image of an unconditional gift is the 
concept that often comes to mind when 
people think of surrogate pregnancy and 
egg donation as an altruistic, other-oriented, 
selfless act. This kind of altruism refers to a 
gift that is given freely (voluntarily), without 
remuneration or external reward. It is 
regarded as unidirectional (one-way) and 
disinterested (offered without regard to the 
quality of the recipient). One of the 
requirements of the unconditional gift is 
that the donor surrenders or ‘relinquishes’ 
any idea of property rights or control over 
their bodily donation. 
All the surrogate mothers and egg 
donors in study 1 regarded their acts as 
altruistic in some way, envisaging their 
donations as symbolic of human 
connection and empathy with people 
experiencing infertility. Additionally, as a 
New Zealand fertility counsellor in study 
2 commented, attitudes about the 
importance of refusing payment for 
surrogacy persist among the group of 
surrogate mothers and donors she sees. As 
she put it: 
It is perfectly reasonable if somebody 
is giving up their time and energy to 
carry a pregnancy for someone else that 
they be given reasonable compensation, 
but I also think that it in some way 
diminishes the altruistic nature of 
doing something incredibly generous 
and meaningful for other people. 
… People who are being surrogates 
often say ‘oh no, I wouldn’t [take 
money], you know that would tarnish 
what I’m doing’ … and egg donors. So, 
not everybody receives the expenses 
payment, they refuse it, they do. 
Several other experts in study 2 
corroborated the existence of this attitude. 
A New Zealand lawyer remarked that the 
positions people take on surrogacy and 
payment are variable, saying: ‘There are 
people who want [a compensation] model 
and there’s people who say they’d be 
insulted to be paid, as it would have 
discouraged them from being a surrogate.’ 
Relational gifting refers to dyadic 
relationships – of which the parent–child 
relationship is paradigmatic – between 
intimates or people who are familiar to or 
become known to one another. Importantly, 
the term ‘relational’ emphasises how 
people’s sense of self is constructed in their 
relationships with others and in terms of 
their social roles. In relational gifting, the 
donor presents their donation as a 
personalised gift which symbolically 
connects them to their recipients (Gilman, 
2018). 
This notion of the gift relation tends to 
underpin the gendered practice of donating 
ovarian eggs and surrogacy and is 
institutionally sanctioned in relation to 
AHR. For example, in New Zealand, fertility 
clinic egg donors and recipients meet for 
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joint counselling sessions in line with 
ACART guidelines and the current Fertility 
Services Standard; in surrogacy 
arrangements in which the relevant parties 
are strangers, ECART expects them to form 
a relationship over six months before 
making an application; and in online 
surrogacy support groups, the social 
etiquette guiding prospective surrogates 
and intended parents’ interactions requires 
that they get to know one another before 
broaching a surrogacy arrangement. The 
same approach to counselling and the 
establishment of a relationship between a 
surrogate mother and intended parent(s) 
is taken by the Patient Review Panel and 
fertility clinics in Victoria, Australia. 
Gift exchange is an anthropological 
concept that emphasises the social 
significance of giving, receiving, and 
reciprocating. The notion of gift exchange 
draws on Mauss’s (1990) view that the 
giver’s identity, essence or spirit is inserted 
or invested in the gift or donative act, and 
consequently requires reciprocation. Again, 
like the gift relation, this is a relational 
ontology. However, gift exchange goes 
further: sharing biological matter such as 
body parts and substances not only creates 
relationship responsibilities between 
donors and recipients; for some cultural 
groups, such as Mäori, gift exchange 
implicates entire kin networks (Mead, 
2003; Salmond, 2012). Where gift exchange 
relationships exist, donors do not construe 
bodily gifts as alienable, and may not see 
themselves as ever relinquishing control 
over the gift. 
The idea that kinship is fixed by 
biological relatedness is a powerful 
motivation for people to assist one 
another’s reproductive journeys. One of 
the surrogate mothers interviewed in study 
1 said that she agreed to be a traditional 
surrogate for her sister because they valued 
keeping genetics and reproductive matters 
within the family, as did several egg donors. 
Likewise, Glover and Rousseau’s (2007) 
qualitative research shows that for Mäori 
who subscribe to traditional views, what is 
given in the process of third-party 
reproduction is not simply the generous 
gift of shared body tissue, but a different 
kind of futurity for the individual 
concerned and the groups to which they 
belong. It is not just bodily matter that gets 
transferred between donors, recipients and 
the larger group, but also rights and 
responsibilities, and, with that, the 
importance of information sharing about 
donor conception. 
Another key motivation for giving 
reproductive gifts or services is to establish 
people’s moral identities as pro-social. In 
these cases, surrogate pregnancy objectifies 
a person’s sense of self as good, kind or civic-
minded and can be conceptualised as a 
process of identity-construction that 
involves a body project. Sociologists have 
talked about people engaging in body 
projects by altering their bodies as part of 
make-over culture and consumption 
practices (Shilling, 1993), but body projects 
are undertaken not simply by the self, for 
the self; some people also deliberately 
transform their bodies for the benefit of 
others, to objectify themselves as a particular 
kind of subject (Shaw, 2008). For instance, 
in addition to displaying maternal affect and 
care, some of the women in study 1 wanted 
to donate ova and become surrogate 
mothers as an assertion of individual agency 
and a way to exercise autonomy and 
independence. Aside from symbolising 
moral connection with the donor, they 
donated reproductive services and materials 
as projects of the self, or as events that 
marked new beginnings in their lives. One 
woman in study 1 had been left at the altar 
by her fiancé; one had experienced a string 
of deaths in rapid succession and, 
recognising the inherent vulnerability of 
human beings, felt compelled to reaffirm 
life; another woman had a pregnancy 
termination. While these women did not 
give the impression that they acted directly 
to resolve feelings of grief or assuage guilt 
at having lost a loved one or a child, such 
life events were not discounted as irrelevant 
to their decision making. 
Additionally, some studies indicate that 
women elect to be surrogate mothers 
because they like being pregnant (Imrie 
and Jadva, 2014). This was not a stated 
motivation for the women I interviewed. 
However, although it is uncommon, there 
are anecdotal accounts of childless/child-
free women in New Zealand becoming 
traditional surrogates because they want 
to experience pregnancy. Additionally, 
several fertility clinics reported seeing 
surrogates who have not been pregnant 
before being approved by ECART. Some of 
these women donate their services to 
family members; others may find 
themselves ‘childless by circumstance’ 
rather than design (Cannold, 2005), and 
consider a surrogacy arrangement as an 
opportunity to ‘try’ pregnancy. 
Ragoné suggests that women who 
become surrogate mothers may also want 
to ‘transcend the limitations of their 
domestic and motherhood roles’ (Ragoné, 
1994, p.65). As an extreme example, some 
surrogates enjoy the public attention their 
acts elicit. In study 1, two surrogate 
mothers were equally generous about 
disclosing their identities and stories as 
surrogate mothers to the media, and later 
came to occupy roles as mentors in the New 
Zealand surrogacy community. A more 
subtle example of this class of motivation 
is about doing something ‘special’, which 
may be related to surrogate mothers’ view 
of themselves as exceptional because not 
everyone can be a surrogate (Berend, 2016). 
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An Australian psychologist from study 
2, who has counselled over 200 surrogates, 
said that she found surrogate mothers 
tended to score slightly lower on the 
median grandiosity scale in psychology 
tests than non-surrogates. She thought this 
stemmed from, ‘a sense of having achieved 
and stuff; it’s that sense of “I want to be 
more than just a mum”, you know, “I want 
to do something … for my children to be 
proud of me.”’ Likewise, several New 
Zealand counsellors talked about egg 
donors and surrogate mothers wanting to 
be ‘special’. One commented: 
Sometimes I think with surrogates it is 
an attention thing – they like to be put 
on a pedestal and thanked and made to 
feel special. I wonder sometimes 
whether money is changing hands in 
some cases. … Maybe you get a trip 
somewhere or you get a holiday, or you 
get a voucher. 
One participant from study 1 described 
her decision to become a surrogate mother 
explicitly as a project. She was first an egg 
donor, and when that was unsuccessful she 
decided to offer her services as a gestational 
surrogate. This participant explained that 
she liked the idea of surrogacy as a project 
because it was ‘different’, enabling her to 
be ‘part of the technology of my day’. 
Unlike egg donation, which has ongoing 
social implications for genetic continuity, 
gestational surrogacy represented a project 
with a finite end. Another AHR project was 
reported to me by a key informant in study 
2 who said that one of their participants 
had set a goal of doing the most surrogate 
pregnancies in New Zealand (undertaking 
three thus far). 
It is clear from the discussion of 
participants’ motivations that there are 
multiple reasons why women might be 
interested in becoming surrogate mothers 
and/or egg donors. Most of the women I 
spoke with were not hard altruists, in that 
they did not view their donative acts as 
unconditional, one-way and with no 
strings attached. They typically wanted 
their generosity to be recognised (and not 
necessarily in terms of payment). Most – 
except for the gestational surrogate in study 
1 – were interested in ongoing relationships 
with the intended parents.  
The question of enforcing surrogacy
The emphasis by ACART and fertility 
clinics on surrogate pregnancy 
arrangements as relational, and the 
fact that parties are already encouraged 
by fertility counsellors and lawyers to 
think through and formalise agreements 
(Wilson, 2019), raises questions about 
the rationale for enforcing surrogacy 
arrangements. Although advocates frame 
their argument as protecting both parties 
should either renege on the agreement, 
enforcement creates an imagined 
contractual environment of competition 
and fear and could be construed as a lack 
of trust rather than cooperation. 
Wilson’s online survey of 185 child and 
family lawyers asked participants whether 
surrogacy contracts should be enforceable. 
Of those who responded to this question, 
54 favoured the status quo as determined 
by the HART Act, and 75 thought surrogacy 
arrangements should be enforceable 
(Wilson, 2018, p.72). Ethicists Walker and 
Van Zyl likewise want to enforce surrogacy 
and advocate radical reform of the current 
system. It is worth outlining their approach, 
as it has been influential in academia and 
the New Zealand media. 
Walker and Van Zyl support a centrally 
controlled regulatory model to monitor 
surrogacy. They present what they call their 
‘professional model’ as an alternative to 
both commercial and altruistic surrogacy 
(Walker and Van Zyl, 2017, p.12). The 
model is predicated on the idea of a 
professional, multi-disciplinary body 
tasked with facilitating surrogacy 
arrangements. This body would offer a 
range of services, one of which would be 
registering and licensing prospective 
surrogates. The concept of licensing 
prospective surrogates is novel and would 
involve a regulatory body to oversee the 
screening and ‘selection’ of surrogate 
mothers, who are paid a fee for service. 
This would mean that surrogates could not 
put themselves forward without being 
vetted for approval (Walker and Van Zyl, 
2017). 
Licensing would also involve training 
surrogates in the care of their bodies and 
pregnancies. There would be additional 
training in the assessment of values and 
ethical standards, which Van Zyl and 
Walker claim is not sufficiently provided 
by current models in New Zealand. In their 
model, the authors understandably 
emphasise the reproductive vulnerability 
of the intended parents, who go to great 
lengths to get a baby and must rely on the 
surrogate’s trustworthiness and generosity. 
They comment that concern about the 
surrogate relinquishing the baby causes 
uncertainty for the intended parents. 
Van Zyl and Walker discuss their 
position regarding the enforceability of 
surrogacy in several texts, stating that in 
their model intended parents would be 
unconditionally recognised as ‘the legal 
parents from birth’ (Van Zyl and Walker, 
2015, p.384). Their view is that ‘if a 
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surrogate cannot make a promise in 
advance to relinquish the baby, she cannot 
enter a surrogacy contract’ (Walker and 
Van Zyl, 2017, p.9). For them, ‘the intended 
parents are automatically the baby’s legal 
parents and no transfer is necessary. The 
surrogate does not make a promise to 
relinquish the baby because it is not hers 
to relinquish’ (ibid., p.18). They go on to 
say that this is ‘the most significant benefit 
of the professional model’ in ‘that it 
removes the prolonged uncertainty that 
intended parents have to endure’ (ibid., 
p.21). Additionally, they do not advocate 
that the surrogate has a ‘parent-like voice’ 
in the new family formation, but do permit 
some presence of the surrogate in the story 
of the family, and some level of contact if 
the surrogate so wishes (ibid., p.22). In 
short, Walker and Van Zyl argue for the 
intended parents to possess the rights and 
obligations of legal parentage from the 
birth of the baby, despite empirical 
evidence that ‘a large majority of surrogates 
relinquish the babies without difficulty and 
have no regrets later on, regardless of 
whether they were gestational or genetic 
surrogates’ (ibid., p.2). 
In my empirical research, participants 
discussed whether they experienced 
bonding and emotional attachment with 
the baby, and if they found it difficult to 
relinquish the baby after the birth. The 
gestational surrogate I spoke with expressed 
no connection to the baby when it was 
born, saying that ‘it helped that it looked 
so unlike [her]’. A traditional surrogate 
mother remarked: 
I felt like I was babysitting a friend’s 
child. I didn’t look at her and think, 
‘Wow, that’s, that’s my daughter’. I’ve 
never ever looked at [baby X] and 
thought, ‘Wow, she’s my daughter’, and 
I’ve never looked at [baby Y] and 
thought, ‘Wow, he’s my son’. Because 
the whole intent of the surrogate is to 
have a baby, have a child, for somebody 
else, so that child is never yours. And I 
think that’s why it’s quite hard for a lot 
of people to understand. 
These comments convey that surrogate 
mothers are often clear in their own minds 
about what they are doing. At the same 
time, these women enter relationships with 
intended parents, which evolve and change 
over time. A stakeholder from study 2, who 
was also a traditional surrogate mother, 
was mindful to represent both sides of the 
surrogate–intended parent story in a recent 
interview with me. At the end of her 
account she commented:  
The main problem is, they’re all very 
close while the surrogate is pregnant, 
helping her out. Oh yes, they’re getting 
on with their children, you know, being 
close with their family, and we’re going 
to be close after, and then afterwards 
she signs the adoption paper and they 
run for the hills, you never hear from 
them. And it’s extremely tough on a 
surrogate. 
Confirming the significance of the 
surrogate–intended parent relationship, an 
Australian stakeholder from study 2 stated: 
‘the key motivation for surrogates … in the 
absence of payment is a relationship. Not 
a relationship with the child, but a 
relationship with the parents.’  
Critiquing the professional model
Elsewhere I have argued that framing 
bodily donation in terms of a hard 
altruism/commodity distinction stymies 
conversation around the social meaning 
of money and reciprocity for donors’ 
body work and affective labour (Shaw, 
2015). This perspective broadly concurs 
with Walker and Van Zyl’s position on 
compensation. That said, I do have 
reservations about other aspects of their 
model. 
The first concern is that, as part of the 
licensing of surrogates which Walker and 
Van Zyl suggest, surrogates would be 
screened and trained so that their values 
are aligned with those of the intended 
parents (2017, p.17). I take this to mean 
that surrogates’ motives must be 
compatible with the values that underpin 
the professional model Van Zyl and Walker 
propose. While the authors are concerned 
to ensure that surrogates act according to 
the right motivation to relinquish the baby, 
the idea of schooling surrogate mothers in 
line with the values of the professional 
model derogates their autonomy and 
would remove surrogates’ right to rebut the 
presumption of parentage in favour of the 
intended parents should the arrangement 
be enforced (see Ceballos, 2019). In a 
pluralistic context such as New Zealand, 
where people have a range of (cross-cutting 
and sometimes contradictory) motivations 
for donating reproductive materials and 
services, Walker and Van Zyl’s proposal 
seems out of step with the way ordinary, 
albeit generous, people make real-life 
moral decisions. 
Walker and Van Zyl stress the pregnant 
surrogate’s right to self-determination and 
bodily integrity (2017, p.147), yet they 
gloss over the corporeal investment 
involved in ‘hosting’ a child for the intended 
parent(s), discussing this dimension of 
generosity in seven lines of their book 
(ibid., pp.72–3). They claim that they do 
not support the commercial system in 
Israel, in which the intended mother, not 
the surrogate, is positioned as the primary 
obstetrics patient (ibid., p.148). However, 
the unintended effects of the professional 
model may result in similar circumstances 
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to those they denounce in Israel. That is, 
one of the reasons the Israeli system 
appears to work is because the surrogate 
mother induces dissociation (called 
‘distancing’ by fertility psychologists) from 
her body in order to collaboratively project 
the pregnancy onto the intended mother, 
thereby facilitating easy relinquishment of 
the baby (Teman, 2009). If New Zealand is 
to adopt a similar system, a much greater 
emphasis on counselling support and 
therapy will be a necessary component of 
the model. 
A third criticism relates to the language 
of enforceability, which is contrary to the 
notion of relational gifting that governs 
institutional ideas and conduct about 
altruistic surrogacy that influence the 
surrogate mother’s desire to elevate her 
relationship with intended parents beyond 
the contractual (Berend, 2016). 
Enforceability is based on a model of social 
relations that pivots around the concept of 
‘relinquishment’. This involves ‘giving up’ 
and signing away a relationship with the 
baby in the interests of the intended 
parents. The idea of relinquishing the baby, 
as an individuated entity, does not account 
for the surrogate mother’s guardianship of 
the baby at birth, her relationship with the 
intended parents, or different cultural 
views of bodily donation in relation to 
social identity (Glover and Rousseau, 
2007). 
Furthermore, the introduction of an 
enforceability clause does not align with 
the HART Act section 4, principles e, f, and 
g. These principles state that: (e) donor 
offspring should be made aware of their 
genetic origins and be able to access 
information about those origins; (f) the 
needs, values, and beliefs of Mäori should 
be considered and treated with respect; and 
(g) the different ethical, spiritual, and 
cultural perspectives in society should be 
considered and treated with respect.
While Mäori views are not 
homogeneous, a child born from a 
surrogate pregnancy arrangement could 
still have ties to the whänau. They would 
retain their whakapapa and social identity 
and would be included in the iwi. Not only 
is this spiritually significant; it may have 
social and economic implications under 
the Waitangi Tribunal settlement process, 
as one fertility counsellor in study 2 
commented: 
For some Mäori who are, you know 
into their culture, or immersed in their 
culture, it’s a difficult thing because it’s 
like well, okay, so if you go down blunt 
lines, this baby then whakapapa’s to 
these people, but if you’re talking 
socially well, then they whakapapa to 
these people, and then you know, the 
strange things that you end up talking 
about, like well, what if they want a 
scholarship? … You’ve got to have at 
least, I guess, two generations, you’ve 
got to know your parents, and you’ve 
got to know your grandparents to be 
able to do it, and then it’s like, oh well, 
what about … you know, what about 
land claims? 
In line with the concept of gift exchange, 
relinquishment of the baby could not only 
symbolically sever the child’s relation to its 
birth mother, it could potentially break the 
child’s relationship to the kinship network. 
While policy around donor registration is 
enormously helpful in enabling offspring 
to contact their donor ‘progenitors’, this 
only works if a person knows they are 
donor-conceived. That may or may not 
happen, as the HART Act does not impose 
a statutory duty on parents to disclose this 
information to donor-conceived children. 
Suggestions by legal scholars that birth 
certificates be annotated to include the 
child’s genetic and birth history (donors’ 
and surrogates’ identities) could be of 
benefit here, but Van Zyl and Walker are 
not advocating this as part of the 
professional model. 
Conclusion
This article offers a conceptual toolkit 
based on sociological analysis of research 
findings to frame the motivations of 
surrogate mothers and the perspectives 
of various professionals who interact 
with them. If New Zealand legislation 
and policy around assisted human 
reproduction in relation to surrogacy 
is updated, this should be more than a 
legal (and philosophical) matter, as one 
of Wilson’s  lawyer participants points 
out (Wilson, 2018, p.73). More empirical 
research, documenting qualitative 
information from participants and service 
users occupying different perspectives 
in this domain, needs to be undertaken. 
Alongside surrogates and intended 
parents, the voices of donor-conceived 
persons, counsellors, psychologists and 
social scientists need to be heard in these 
debates. And any envisaged changes to 
legislation need to be flexible enough to 
accommodate multiple pathways to family 
formation without jeopardising cultural 
and situational diversity. 
1 This study received funding from the FHSS at Victoria 
University of Wellington (#217783; #219294) and Human 
Ethics Committee approval (#24373).
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